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 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Context 
International human rights law is concerned with the enjoyment of human rights and was 
primarily designed to limit abuses by Governments against their citizens.  When the first 
human rights treaties were drafted, only States were recognized as the main actors in the 
international community.  However, our societies are now faced with the new challenges of 
a globalized world which also involves powerful non-State actors (such as intergovernmen-
tal organizations and transnational corporations (hereafter: TNCs)) and where the actions 
and policies of every State can affect individuals living in other States.  In this globalized 
community, States and non-State actors interrelate and influence the realization of human 
rights1.   Non-State actors, such as global corporations, can impact on human rights, for 
instance through their employment and environmental practices, as well as, in their support 
for political regimes and for policy changes2.   
 
Globalization can be associated with development in technology and information pro-
cessing, as well as, increasing reliance on the free market but it also leads to the diminution 
of the role and budget of the State and to the privatization of functions which were tradi-
tionally considered as being the exclusive competence of the State.  Globalization may im-
ply economic growth for certain countries but may as well result in growing inequalities 
between and within countries.  This consequently results in increasing the role and respon-
sibilities given to private actors in the corporate sector and to civil society3.  The Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: CESCR) has recognized that glob-
alization might not be incompatible with human rights but: 
                                                 
 
1
 Maastricht Principles, preamble; Salomon (2007) p.39  
2
 UNDP (2002) 
3
 CESCR Statement (1998) E/1999/22-E/C.12/1998/26 para 2 
 2
“if not complemented by appropriate additional policies, globalization risks 
downgrading the central place accorded to human rights by the United Nations 
Charter in general and the International Bill of Human Rights in particular. This 
is especially the case in relation to economic, social and cultural rights [em-
phasis added]”4.   
 
The challenge will rest in the adaptability of human rights law with the globalized world to 
reach beyond traditional concepts, such as State sovereignty, to secure global justice5.  In 
order to adapt to this globalized community, there is a need to widen traditional States’ 
obligations under human rights to include extraterritorial States’ obligations.  For example, 
if a German corporation is involved in forced evictions in Uganda, what would be the obli-
gations of the German State under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereafter: ICESCR) with regard to that German corporation’s actions?  If a 
Swedish clothing company is violating workers’ rights in Bangladesh, what are the obliga-
tions of the Swedish State? 
 
With the prominent expansion of TNCs in the last decades, more attention was given to the 
interrelationship between States, corporations and human rights.  This interrelationship is 
the source of a long-standing international debate on whether mandatory norms are re-
quired.  Professor John Gerard Ruggie (hereafter: Ruggie), was appointed in 2005 to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council (hereafter: 
HRC)) with a mandate to clarify this debate6.  Ruggie developed the “Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and 
Remedy' Framework" (hereafter: UN Guiding Principles) which were endorsed by the 
HRC in June 20117.  The UN Guiding Principles are based on three core principles pro-
                                                 
 
4
 Id. at para 3 
5
 Coomans (2004) p.184 
6
 CHR (2005) E/CN.4/2005/69 
7
 HRC (2011) RES/17/4 
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posed by the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (PRR Framework)8.  Ruggie 
acknowledged that this perplexed relationship between business and human rights is rooted 
in the governance gaps created by globalization as these gaps provide for a permissive en-
vironment for corporate abuses without adequate reparation9.   
 
Demarcation  
Recognizing the importance and the complementary of each of the three core principles 
suggested by Ruggie, this paper will focus on the first pillar of the PRR Framework – the 
State duty to protect against human rights abuses –, with a specific focus on the extraterri-
torial States obligations to protect against corporate violations of economic, social and cul-
tural (ESC) rights.  In addition to the UN Guiding Principles (2011), extraterritorial States 
obligations related to ESC rights have  also been addressed, for instance, by the CESCR, 
the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic 
and Social Rights (hereafter: Limburg Principles) (1986), the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: Maastricht Guidelines) 
(1997), the UN Norms on the Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations (2003), and 
the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: Maastricht Principles) (2011).  For the purpose of 
this paper the interpretations of the CESCR, the UN Guiding Principles and the Maastricht 
Principles will be further analyzed. 
 
This is a well-established principle of international law that territorial States (or host States 
of the TNCs’ activities) have the primary responsibility for human rights violations.  A 
more controversial issue is, however, the extension of the State duty to the TNC’s home 
                                                 
 
8
 The three core principles are: “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, includ-
ing business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more effective access to 
remedies”, Ruggie (2008) A/HRC/8/5 para 9 
9
 Id. at para 3, 17 
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State of incorporation10.  In this paper, focus will be given to this indirect accountability of 
States for corporate abuses rather than the direct accountability of corporations for human 
rights abuses.  This paper therefore aims at defining the obligations of State Parties to 
ICESCR (TNC’s home State) to protect against ESC rights violations committed by corpo-
rations on individuals living in another State (TNC’s host State).  
 
Research Question: 
What is the current legal understanding of States’ extraterritorial obligations to protect 
against corporate abuses under the ICESCR? 
 
This research question will be considered on the basis of the ICESCR, UN Guiding Princi-
ples and Maastricht Principles.  From this analysis, this paper aims at strengthening the 
legal character of ESC rights as clarifying the extraterritorial obligations of home States 
can contribute to better enforcement and realization of ESC rights. 
 
Why focusing on States’ extraterritorial obligations? 
Territorial States (host States) bear the primary responsibility to ensure the enjoyment of 
human rights to individuals living on their territory.  But some States might not always be 
able/willing to live up to their human rights obligations or they might not even be party of a 
human rights treaty11.  The majority of human rights abuses occur in countries where gov-
ernance is affected by conflicts, corruption, extreme poverty or where the rule of law is 
deficient12.  To effectively ensure the enjoyment of human rights, the States of incorpora-
tion of TNCs (home States) may have extraterritorial obligations with regards to the indi-
viduals located in those States (host States) which might be unable or unwilling to bear the 
duties of human rights.  The reconnaissance of the extraterritorial human rights obligations 
                                                 
 
10
 Id. at para.18,19; Ruggie (2009) A/HRC/11/13 para.15; Ruggie (2010) A/HRC/14/27 para.46-49; Maas-
tricht Principle 2, commentary 
11
 Augenstein and Kinley (2013)   
12
 Ruggie supra note 8 at para 16; Ruggie (2006) E/CN.4/2006/97 para 20-25; Kamatali (2012) p.446 
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of States could therefore contribute to an effective protection of human rights in a global-
ized economy where despite the growing of global wealth, poverty and socio-economic 
inequalities remain omnipresent throughout the world. 
 
Why emphasizing on States’ extraterritorial obligations (public governance) rather than 
corporate social responsibility (corporate governance)? 
Globalization has given more power to the private sector (i.e.TNCs) 13.  Global companies 
involve multiple corporate entities within multiple countries enhancing the economic effi-
ciency of companies but also diminishing their ability to manage their global value 
chains14.  An increased number of TNCs has been accused of committing human rights 
abuses15.  Thus, the challenge of globalization, with regards to business and human rights, 
lies in enhancing corporate and public governance to reduce governance gaps.  Three alter-
natives are possible to improve the human rights accountability of TNCs: the responsibility 
of states to control TNCs, self-regulation by TNCs (code of conduct or international 
framework agreements) or at the global level, direct obligations for corporations under in-
ternational law.   
 
As highlighted by Ruggie, the existing international human rights framework “rests upon 
the bedrock role of States”16.  States hold a unique position to “foster corporate cultures in 
                                                 
 
13
 Ruggie (2006) E/CN.4/2006/97 para.20-25 
14
 Value Chain refers to the range of activities necessary to bring a product from its conception to its end use. 
15
 For example, the pipeline project of TOTAL (French Corporation) in Myanmar resulted in serious human 
rights violations (source: FIDH); Various Canadian Mining corporations are accused of human rights abuses 
in developing countries.  For instance, Hudbay Minerals, Inc (Canadian Company), the parent company of 
Compañía Guatemalteca de Níquel (CGN), is now facing accusations of human rights abuses (killings, gang 
rapes and forced evictions of indigenous population) in Guatemala (source: Choc v. HudBay Minerals Inc. & 
Caal v. HudBay Minerals Inc.: Lawsuits against Canadian company HudBay Minerals Inc. over human rights 
abuse in Guatemala) 
16
 Ruggie supra note 8 at para 50 
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which respecting rights is an integral part of doing business”17.  The guidance and control 
necessary for corporations to positively influence the realization of human rights is to be 
primarily provided by States which are the actors obligated under international human 
rights law.  
  
Without diminishing the important role companies themselves have with regards to the 
respect of human rights, this paper will nonetheless focus on defining the content of extra-
territorial obligations of States in the existing human rights system.  More specifically, this 
paper is an attempt to flesh out the obligation to protect ESC rights as incumbent to the 
home State. 
 
Terminology Clarification 
Basic concepts, such as transnational corporation and State’s extraterritorial obligations, 
have to be defined to clarify the scope of the present paper.  A transnational corporation 
should be understood as an economic entity performing activities in more than one coun-
try18.  The term “States’ extraterritorial obligations”19 refers to obligations with regards to 
the acts and omissions of a State, within or outside its territory, which have impacts on the 
enjoyment of human rights of people living outside that State’s territorial borders and could 
also refer to the global obligations requiring States to realize human rights through coop-
eration as stated in the Charter of the United Nations and other human rights instruments20.  
This paper will however focus on the first aspect of the definition.  Home States and host 
                                                 
 
17
 Id. at para 29 
18
 UN Norms on the Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, art 20; 
For other suggestions, refer to Chakraborty (2006) 
19Extraterritorial obligations can also be referred to as: “transnational obligations, transboundary obligations, 
transborder obligations, crossborder obligations, international obligations, universal obligations, external 
obligations, inter-State obligations, extraterritorial jurisdiction, global obligations and third State obligations” 
(Gibney. On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations (2013) p.32) 
20
 Maastricht Principle 8 
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States are also two concepts that need to be clearly understood in the context of extraterri-
torial obligations of States.  Home State is referred to as the State where the corporation is 
domiciled or headquartered whereas the host State will refer to the State where the TNC 
exercises its activities.  Extraterritorial obligations of the home State might therefore be 
triggered when a TNC commits human rights abuses in the host State.   
 
Structure 
This paper is divided into two main sections.  The first section deals with the specific fea-
tures of human rights and more specifically ESC rights as stipulated in ICESCR.  The un-
derstanding of ESC rights’ characteristics and the incumbent territorial obligations of States 
following the ICESCR are relevant in order to determine the extraterritorial scope of 
States’ obligations under this treaty.  The analysis proposed in the second section focuses 
on the scope of the extraterritorial States obligations to protect ESC rights according to 
relevant principles of international law, the ICESCR, the UN Guiding Principles and the 
Maastricht Principles.  A case is also presented in order to emphasize the importance of 
recognizing the extraterritorial obligation to protect of home States.   
 8
1 Economic, Social and Cultural (ESC) Rights 
1.1 Characteristics of ESC Rights 
1.1.1 General Features of Human Rights Law 
What are human rights? Human rights are a statement of what human beings require to live 
fully human lives21.  Their central foundation is the respect and protection of human digni-
ty22.   
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, growing concern to prevent catastrophes led to 
the establishment of treaties devoted to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms at the international level.  The UN Charter (1945) is the first international instru-
ment requiring the respect for human rights.  Subsequently adopted, the International Bill 
of Human Rights – Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter: UDHR) (1948), 
ICESCR (1966:  160 parties to date), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (hereafter: ICCPR) (1966: 167 parties to date), and their protocols – is recognized as 
the main source of international human rights law providing for a comprehensive coverage 
of human rights.   
 
In its preamble, the UDHR highlights that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world”.  The UDHR recognizes human rights as moral 
entitlements whereas the two Covenants convert these moral rights into enforceable legal 
rights23.   
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 OHCHR (2005) p.vii 
22
 UN Charter preamble; UDHR preamble, art.1; ICESCR preamble; ICCPR preamble 
23
 Minkler (2013) p.3-4 
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International human rights law is defined around the centrality of States where States are 
bound through treaties leaving non-State actors outside of this international human rights 
legal framework24.  Human rights law was developed on the basis of a state/individual rela-
tionship involving unequal relations of power where the state has the potential to commit 
abuses to the detriment of individuals’ interests.25  For instance, under the two human 
rights Covenants (ICESCR and ICCPR), it is only each “State party” to each Covenant that 
undertakes human rights obligations and is thus ultimately accountable for compliance with 
them26. 
 
An integral part of the international law framework, human rights law bears some distin-
guishing features.  Human rights treaties are not characterized by the traditional contractual 
and consensual nature of international treaties but rather by a particular object and purpose, 
i.e. the protection of human dignity.  They are of an objective nature as they protect the 
fundamental rights of individuals rather than the interests of States27.  The reciprocal nature 
of treaties is thence inapplicable to human rights treaties as the contracting States have ob-
ligations towards the individuals (vertical obligation) within their jurisdiction rather than 
towards other contracting States (horizontal obligation)28.  Human rights obligations are 
applicable regardless of the acceptance of those obligations by other States29.  The principle 
of reciprocity would imply equal treatment and reciprocal exchange of rights for the benefit 
of the contracting States but human rights protect international common interests rather 
than reciprocal or bilateral interests.  The non-reciprocity nature of human rights treaties 
follows therefore from the nature of the obligations enshrined in those treaties.  The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter: VCLT) recognizes this special non-
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 Steiner, Alston and Goodman (2008) p.1385 
25
 Ssenyonjo (2008) p.726 
26
 ICCPR art.2(1); ICESCR art.2(1) 
27
 Orakhelashvili (2003) p.531-53  
28
 HRC General Comment 24 (1994) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 17 
29
 Gondek (2009) p. 24  
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reciprocal character of human rights instruments30.  Human rights treaties are also charac-
terized by the continuity of the obligations involved as the rights enshrined in human rights 
treaties belong to the people living in a State party and continue to belong to them even 
when a change of government occurs31.  
 
Another characteristic of human rights worth emphasizing in the context of this paper is the 
global consensus on the universality, interdependency, indivisibility and interrelatedness of 
human rights32.  Universality implies that human rights belong to all human beings and 
derived from people’s inherent dignity.  Individuals enjoy human rights because of their 
humanity and not because of their membership to a society, nationality or ethnicity33.  The 
universality of human rights is recognized by the UN Charter and the principal human 
rights treaties34.  Following the near-universal ratification of the UN Charter and of these 
treaties, the principle recognizing that all individuals are to have their rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms respected is well established35.  Human rights treaties are based on universal 
values rather than contractual values.  Furthermore all rights are interrelated meaning that 
the improvement of one right will influence the advancement of other rights and likewise, 
the deprivation of one right will adversary affect other rights.  Being interdependent, the 
enjoyment of one right might require the realization of other rights which might or might 
not be from the same Covenants.  For instance, the realization of the right to life (ICCPR, 
article 6 (1)) might require taking into account the right to an adequate standard of living 
and the right to health (ICESCR, article 11 and 12). The separation of the rights into two 
                                                 
 
30
 VCLT art.60 (5)  
31
 HRC General Comment No 26 (1997) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 /Add.8/Rev.1, para 4-5 
32
 Recognized, for instance, by the UDHR preamble, art 1-2; ICESCR preamble; Optional Protocol ICESCR 
preamble; ICCPR preamble; Vienna Declaration (1993) preamble, para.1, 5; Maastricht Principle 5 
33
 Sogkly and Gibney (2007) p.273 
34
 UN Charter art.1; UDHR preamble, art 1, 28;  ICESCR preamble para 2; ICCPR preamble para 2 
35
 Skogly and Gibney (2007) p.269; Martin (2013); the universality of human rights is also criticized by some 
scholars, e.g. Brown (1997) 
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Covenants does not preclude for their indivisibility.  The UDHR is an example of the ex-
pression of fundamental human rights stipulated in one integrated instrument36. 
 
Human rights law is constantly evolving.  As pointed out by Amartya Sen, one of several 
questions that must still be addressed concerning human rights is the duties and obligations 
human rights give rise to37.  Following the acceptance of the universal nature of human 
rights, who is obligated to provide for their realization and protection?  There is an increas-
ing recognition for the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties and more consid-
eration is given to the duty of States to protect38.  Before focusing on the scope and content 
of the extraterritorial States obligations to protect ESC rights, the following section will 
highlight the main characteristics of ESC rights. 
 
1.1.2 The Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The ICESCR is the foundational treaty for ESC rights containing some of the most signifi-
cant international legal provisions on ESC rights and shall constitute the basis of the pre-
sent analysis on extraterritorial States’ obligations.  All human rights, civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, are indivisible and interrelated but they might impose 
different duties on States.  The CESCR affirmed that ESC rights can be realized in various 
economic and political systems which recognize the interdependency and indivisibility of 
human rights.  Notwithstanding the general recognition that all human rights must be treat-
ed on an “equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis”39, some are still 
reluctant to protect ESC rights40.  For instance, the U.S. government maintains that ESC 
rights are of a different category of rights that should be viewed as goals rather than 
                                                 
 
36
 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights also recognized the equality between ESC rights and 
CP rights; Mzikenge Chirwa (2008) 
37
 Sen (2004) p. 322 
38
 Shaw (2008)  p.276 
39
 Vienna Declaration (1993) para.5 
40
 For example, Cranston (1973); O’Neill (1986); Rawls (1999) 
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rights41.  Despite the criticism that ESC rights might receive, the fact is that ICESCR is a 
treaty giving rise to obligations with regards to ESC rights.  There is a general consensus 
that there are no fundamental differences between the categories of ESC and CP rights42.   
ESC and CP rights are enforceable and justiciable rights43. 
 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR on the general obligation of States is of particular importance 
for a complete understanding of the Covenant as this provision has “a dynamic relationship 
with all the other provisions of the Covenant”44: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures”. 
 
Contrasting with CP rights, Article 2(1) ICESCR refers to a “progressive” realization of 
ESC rights rather than requiring the Parties to “respect and ensure” as stipulated in Article 
2(1) ICCPR.  The term progressive shall be understood in the sense that the full realization 
of these rights might require some time but shall not deprive the obligation of its mean-
ing45.  In order to progressively realize ESC rights, States are required to take “immediate” 
steps46  and to cooperate, for the progress towards the realization of ESC rights.  A progres-
sive realization does not imply the indefinite postponement of actions towards the realiza-
tion of ESC rights.  The steps to be taken should be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as 
                                                 
 
41
 Comments submitted by the United States of America, Right to Development (2001)  E/CN.4/2001/26,  p. 
46 
42
 Alson and Quinn (1987) p.156-222; Coomans (2009) 
43
 CESCR General Comment No. 9 (1998) E/C.12/1998/24, para 10; Coomans (2009) p.310-312 
44
 CESCR General Comment No. 3 (1990) E/1991/23,  para1 
45
 Id. at para. 9 
46
 Limburg Principles 16, 21-24; CESCR supra note 44 at para. 9;  Articles requiring immediate steps: 
ICESCR art 2(2), 7(a)(i), 8, 10(3), 13(2) (a), 13(3), 13(4) and 15(3); Coomans (2009) p.304-305 
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clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant”47.  For 
instance, any process undertaken for the fulfillment of ESC rights should be exercised 
without discrimination which should be understood as an immediate obligation48.   
 
To satisfy the obligation to take steps, States must take “all appropriate means including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.  This has been interpreted as States par-
ties have flexibility in determining what is necessary for the realization of ESC rights but 
the importance of legislative measures should still be emphasized49.  The mere enactment 
of legislation will however not be sufficient, what is required is the effective implementa-
tion of the legislation ensuring the protection of ESC rights50.  Non-legislative measures 
(e.g. judicial or other effective remedies, administrative, financial, educational and social 
measures) will also be required, as all appropriate means should be put in place to secure 
the protection of ESC rights51.   
 
The Committee also emphasized that States must “take steps individually and through in-
ternational assistance and cooperation”.   In accordance with the UN Charter, principles of 
international law and the Covenant, it considered that the obligation of cooperation for the 
realization of ESC rights rests upon all States52. 
 
The progressive realization of ESC rights will nevertheless differ from State to State de-
pending of their “available resources” whereas States’ obligations with regard to civil and 
political rights are more of an absolute nature53.  The Covenant refers to “maximum” avail-
                                                 
 
47
 CESCR supra note 44 at para 2 
48
 ICESCR art.2(2); CESCR id. at para 1 
49
 Alston and Quinn (1987) p.167, CESCR, id. at para 3 
50
 Alston and Quinn (1987) p.169 
51
 CESCR supra note 44 at para.3, 5-7 
52
 Id. at para.13-14 
53
 ICCPR art 2 
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able resources implying that Governments should consider the realization of ESC rights as 
a high priority objective and requires them to use efficiently the resources intended for this 
objective.  By incorporating the component of cooperation and of international economic 
and technical assistance into Article 2(1), the Covenant also recognizes that the realization 
of ESC rights for some countries will necessitate external resource transfers.  States must 
therefore match their efforts to the realization of ESC rights with their capabilities (nation-
ally generated and externally transferred).   
 
Finally, the recent entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) 
on 5 May 2013, further contributes to the justiciablity and the effective enforcement of 
ESC rights and rectifies the longstanding imbalance in the protection of ESC and CP rights.  
Until 2013, there was only a complaint mechanism for CP rights.  Individuals are now enti-
tled to submit a claim for violations of their ESC rights to the CESCR, the supervisory 
body of the ICESCR54.   
 
The CESCR also publishes its interpretation of the ICESCR, known as General Comments, 
which are considered as being authoritative statements on the meaning of the provisions of 
the Covenant on ESC rights.  Although not legally binding, these statements can act as tool 
for standards setting55, i.e. on the extraterritorial obligations of States. 
 
The following section will look upon the tripartite typology approach to define States’ ob-
ligations.  This approach also contributes to emphasis the equal nature of ESC and CP 
rights and is furthermore a valuable tool clarifying the different levels of States obligations. 
 
                                                 
 
54
 Only individuals under the jurisdiction of the eleven State Parties to the Protocol will be entitled to submit 
complaints to the CESCR: Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Uruguay.   
55
 Ssenyonjo (2009) p.29 
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1.2 Defining States' Obligations under the ICESCR 
 
Human rights are characterized by entitlements of right holders and obligations of duty 
bearers56.  Human rights law imposes on these duty bearers (i.e. States) different levels of 
obligations.  The concept of different level of obligations was first developed in the early 
1980s by Henry Shue57. And was further developed by Absjørn Eide who proposed a mod-
el with different levels of obligations: obligation to respect, obligation to protect and obli-
gation to fulfil.  The obligation to fulfill comprises an obligation to facilitate and to pro-
vide58.  Eide’s suggested model was adopted by the CESCR and is now a well-established 
interpretative tool59.  The CESCR added an additional component to the obligation to fulfill 
which is the obligation to promote60.   The tripartite typology provides a tool for a better 
understanding of State obligations imposed by human rights law illustrating the interde-
pendency of all duties, the equal nature of all human rights as well as the scope of the obli-
gations61.  All levels of the proposed typology of duties are interrelated and can be applied 
to each human right.  Mostly used for ESC rights, the tripartite typology is nevertheless 
applicable to CP rights also62. The full enjoyment of human rights will depend on the per-
formance of all levels of obligations.  Finally, it is worth underlying that the tripartite ty-
pology model has contributed to overcome the misconception that ESC rights are second-
ary to CP rights63.  ESC rights cannot be described as requiring solely positive obligations 
whereas civil and political rights merely negative obligations64.  
                                                 
 
56
 Id. at p.17 
57
 Shue (1996) p. 52-64  
58
 CESCR General Comment No. 12(1999) E/C.12/1999/5, para.15; CESCR General Comment No. 13(1999) 
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 Ziegler (2008) para 20 
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61
 Sepúlveda (2003) p.170 
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 Gondek (2009) p.60 
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More specifically, according to the CESCR, each level of obligations entails different du-
ties.  The obligation to respect requires States to not take measures preventing individuals 
from the enjoyment of their rights, a negative duty.  States should respect the resources 
owned by individuals and the individuals’ use of the necessary resources to realize their 
rights and satisfy their needs65.   
 
The obligation to protect requires States to take measures to ensure that third parties (indi-
vidual, groups or corporations) do not violate individuals’ rights66.  This is a positive duty.  
This obligation of protection is regarded as the most important according to Eide67.  It re-
quires, for instance, States to uphold the principle of non-discrimination in legislation, to 
adopt measures to prosecute perpetrators of rights violations and to protect the vulnerable 
and marginalized groups from human rights abuses.  For example, with respect to the right 
to food, the CESCR stated that “the obligation to protect requires measures by the State to 
ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate 
food”68.  Consequently, the failure of a State to take all necessary measures to protect the 
individuals within its jurisdiction (such as to regulate the activities of non-State actors with-
in its jurisdiction in order to prevent them to violate ESC rights) will amount into a viola-
tion of ESC rights by that State69.  This obligation of protection entails significant im-
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portance in the context of corporate abuses and shall be further analysed in the following 
section. 
 
Entailing further positive duties, the obligation to facilitate (fulfill) requires States to 
strengthen people’s access to resources and means for the enjoyment of their rights whereas 
the obligation to provide (fulfill) necessitates States to procure individuals unable to enjoy 
their rights with the resources and means necessary70. On the other hand, the obligation to 
promote (fulfill) requires States, inter alia, to provide information to individuals about their 
rights; to provide training; and to support individual in making informed choices about 
their enjoyment of rights.   
 
From the tripartite typology analysis, the necessary steps to be taken for the realization of 
ESC rights become clearer.  Human rights are universal and confer entitlements to rights 
holders and obligations to duty bearers.  Notwithstanding some differentiations between the 
two Covenants, ESC rights and CP rights are both enforceable and of equal nature71. 
ICESCR is a treaty that gives rise to formal obligations for States Parties.  Part of the actual 
legal debate concerning ESC rights lies in the existence of legal States’ extraterritorial ob-
ligations.  The following section will focus on the duty-bearers of ESC rights and the con-
tent and scope of their extraterritorial obligations in the context of a globalized world 
where poverty affects billion of individuals. 
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2 States’ Extraterritorial Obligations under ICESCR - Obligation 
to protect 
“[…] the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community” 
– Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993)  
 
Can, for example, Canada be expected to protect victims of ESC rights abuses located in 
Guatemala if those abuses are committed by a TNC (mining company) domiciled in Cana-
da but whose activities are in Guatemala? Does Canada have an obligation to cooperate 
with the authorities of Guatemala to protect the victim of corporate abuses located in Gua-
temala?  The question to answer is whether States parties to ICESCR are bound to provide 
protection abroad against corporate abuses to non-nationals.  States extraterritorial obliga-
tions are the concern of a diagonal relationship between States and individuals in other 
countries rather than a vertical (State and its citizens) or horizontal (State/State) relation-
ship72.   
  
Following the general recognition of the universality of human rights, Skogly and Gibney, 
argued that “[o]ne of the great disappointments concerning human rights is the way in 
which these rights are declared to be “universal”, at the same time that the protection of 
those rights […] has been severely limited by territorial considerations”73.  The acceptance 
of extraterritorial human rights obligations provokes controversy for various reasons in-
cluding: the perception that it is contrary to the equality and sovereignty of States; the mis-
trust that the bases for such obligations are beyond what is classically accepted with re-
gards to extraterritorial jurisdiction; and the apprehension that it may result in undue limits 
on States’ domestic and foreign policies74.  
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Notwithstanding the general understanding that in a globalized world events and acts can 
have impact beyond a State’s territory, the legal recognition of States’ obligations does not 
reach the same acceptance75.  But states should be responsible for their acts or omissions 
within or outside their territory.  International human rights law requires the establishment 
of an international order protecting human rights76.  Defined extraterritorial human rights 
obligations would set limitations on States’ actions but without prescribing the way States 
should conduct their international policies77.  Moreover, in accordance with the duty to 
eradicate worldwide poverty78, States could be obliged to contribute directly to the realiza-
tion of ESC rights for individuals in other countries.   
 
In order to understand the actual legal scope of State obligations for ESC rights in an extra-
territorial context, this paper will focus on the bases of these obligations according to prin-
ciples of international law, the ICESCR, the UN Guiding Principles and the Maastricht 
Principles. 
 
2.1 Principles of International Law 
Before considering the bases of extraterritorial States’ obligations under international hu-
man rights law, it is worth emphasizing the concept of jurisdiction as defined under interna-
tional law.   
 
In international law jurisdiction is closely related to the equality and sovereignty of states, 
which constitute two major pillars of international law79.  The corollaries of the sovereign 
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equality of States are: a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over the territory and the indi-
viduals living on it; a duty of non-intervention in matters related to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of other states; and the necessity of States’ consent to create obligations whether from 
customary law or from treaties80.  In accordance with these general rules of international 
law, the VCLT establishes a general presumption that international treaties are binding on 
States in respect of their territory81.   
 
Following the sovereign equality of States and of its corollaries82, States usually refrain 
from interfering in the affairs of other States83.  Grounds for jurisdiction are closely related 
to the requirement under international law to respect the territorial sovereignty of States.  
Sovereignty can therefore seem a priori as a bar to the extraterritorial obligations of States.   
 
International law defines the concept of jurisdiction as the limits of the power of a State.  
This power of States is divided into: the power to make laws, decisions and rules (prescrip-
tive jurisdiction) and the power to enforce these laws, decisions and rules (enforcement or 
adjudicative jurisdiction) which can be achieved through legislative, executive and judicial 
actions.  Traditionally, jurisdiction is presumed to be territorial (within the limit of a State’s 
sovereignty) and may be exercised extraterritorially under specific international law ba-
ses84.  The four classical bases for the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
recognized in international law are: active personality principle/ passive personality princi-
ple, security principle, effects doctrine and universal jurisdiction principle85.   If jurisdiction 
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is established in accordance with these bases, extraterritorial States’ obligations could be 
triggered.   
 
Whereas international law creates inter-state obligations, human rights law creates obliga-
tions that a State owns to individuals.  Within human rights law, jurisdiction is a concept 
used to define the scope of human rights treaty’s obligations.  Jurisdiction does not refer 
solely to the situations where a State is entitled to act but also to the group of individuals to 
which a State shall secure human rights86.  As human rights treaties are of a different nature 
considering their object and purpose87, the concept of jurisdiction under human rights trea-
ties may have a broader scope and apply to a conduct that might not be considered as under 
the limits of jurisdiction imposed under international law88.  In fact, in the current process 
of globalization and following the need for international cooperation between sovereign 
States and for protection of universal human rights, there is a trend to widen the interpreta-
tion of traditional territorial concepts, such as jurisdiction and national sovereignty in re-
gards to human rights89.  If a corporation locates its activities in a State that is unwilling or 
unable to ensure the respect of human rights (host State), the home State of this corporation 
could play a significant role to ensure that that corporation does not take advantage of this 
lack of willingness and effective legal framework to commit human rights violations.  As a 
general rule and in correlation with the concept of territorial sovereignty, the primary obli-
gation for the realization of human rights always belongs to national governments.  How-
ever, the strict application of States’ obligations which is limited to States’ own territories 
might be outdated in the current context of globalization and international interactions90.   
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Situations allowing for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, more particularly with 
regards to ESC rights, were further developed in the Maastricht Principles.  A deeper anal-
ysis of these situations will thus be provided in section 2.4 of this paper on the Maastricht 
Principles. 
 
2.2 Legal Basis under ICESCR  
ICESCR may offer a basis for defining the content of the extraterritorial human rights obli-
gations of States.  As argued by Coomans, the Covenant does not contain an explicit legal 
basis for the extraterritorial obligations of States but can offer an implicit basis (interna-
tional assistance and cooperation)91.  The drafters of the ICESCR included a language indi-
cating that obligations under this Covenant may go beyond the national border of the States 
Parties92.  This language is clearly expressed in Article 2(1) which provides for the general 
States’ obligations93.  Contrary to Article 2(1) ICCPR, Article 2(1) ICESCR does not make 
a direct reference to jurisdiction and territory94.  In fact, the term jurisdiction is almost ab-
sent of the ICESCR with the exception of Article 14 on compulsory primary education.  It 
was argued that ICESCR provides mainly for territorial obligations but leaves also some 
scope for extraterritorial application95.  It can consequently be assumed that States obliga-
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tions under ICESCR were not intended to be limited to their own territory only.  This ar-
gument is further supported by article 29 VCLT which stipulates that a treaty is binding 
upon the entire territory of a State Party unless otherwise intended or established.  In the 
case of the ICESCR which is protecting human rights, limiting obligations to the territory 
of a State would be inadequate to ensure full protection of these rights in the context of a 
globalized world96.  The key question seems therefore to be not whether States have extra-
territorial obligations under the ICESCR but rather on the nature and content of those obli-
gations97.  
 
The provision on the general States’ obligations also gives an international dimension to 
ESC rights when highlighting international assistance and cooperation.  From the drafting 
history of this article, it is possible to conclude that international assistance and cooperation 
-without any territorial or jurisdictional limitations-were viewed as necessary for the reali-
zation of the Covenant’s rights98.  International assistance and cooperation between mem-
bers of the global community might be necessary to deal with challenges impacting beyond 
national borders99.  It is suggested that the notion of international assistance and coopera-
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tion included in the Covenant implies that the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill do 
not only operate solely at the national level but also at the international level100. This as-
sumption is also supported by the preamble of the Covenant which refers to the “obligation 
of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and freedoms”.   States Parties to ICESCR aim at guaranteeing a 
universal respect of human rights which might necessitate the recognition of an extraterri-
torial obligation to assist other States to secure the enjoyment of human rights. A few oth-
ers articles of the Covenant also make direct reference to the international dimension of 
States obligations under the Covenant101. 
 
2.2.1 CESCR 
The CESCR General Comments (refer to Annex) can also give further guidance on the 
extraterritorial reach of States’ obligations as stipulated in the ICESCR.  The statements of 
the CESCR are not legally binding but can nevertheless provide us with useful guidelines.   
 
The CESCR favored the traditional approach of holding States as the primary responsible 
for human rights102.  Territorial States bear the primary responsibilities with regards to the 
realization of human rights within their territory.  However the territorial States might be 
unable or unwilling to ensure the enjoyment of human rights on their territory.  Therefore, 
in its General Comments, the CESCR has expressly addressed the “international obliga-
tions” of States recognizing that in order to comply with their obligations under the 
ICESCR, States obligations might extent outside their national territory103.  Effectiveness 
requires that the human rights obligations to respect, protect and fulfill extend extraterrito-
rially including individuals from other states104.  Ssenyonjo argues that States are responsi-
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ble for their policies violating human rights beyond their borders and for policies indirectly 
supporting violations of ESC rights by third parties.  Consequently, under certain circum-
stances, States may be required to respect, protect and fulfill ESC rights in other States105.     
 
With regards to the obligation to protect, as expressed in CESCR General Comments, 
States have to “prevent third parties from violating the right [to the highest standard of 
health] in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or 
political means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable inter-
national law”106.  Referring to Article 9 ICESCR, the CESCR explicitly stated that: “States 
parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by preventing their own 
citizens and national entities from violating this right in other countries”107. 
 
More explicitly, in 2011, the CESCR specifically addressed the obligations of States to 
respect, protect and fulfill with regards to the corporate sector.  On the obligation to pro-
tect, the CESCR affirmed that: “States Parties [i.e. home States] should also take steps to 
prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have their main seat 
under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of 
the host States under the Covenant”108.  The Committee clearly held that home States of 
TNCs have an extraterritorial obligation to protect. 
 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights quoted the CESCR when identifying that States 
have four different types of extraterritorial obligations which are to: 
                                                 
 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 CESCR supra note 58 at para 39; Also refer to Annex  
107
 CESCR General Comment No. 19 (2007) E/C.12/GC/19, para 54; Also refer to CESCR General Comment 
No.15 (2002) E/C.12/2002/11, para 33: “to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right 
to water of individuals and communities in other countries”; CESCR General Comment No.14 (2000) para 
39;  and CESCR General Comment No.18 (2006) E/C.12/GC/18, para 35 
108
 CESCR supra note 102 at para.5; Reaffirmed in CESCR supra note 99 at p.2 
 26
 
“•Refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights in other coun-
tries; 
 
•Take measures to prevent third parties (e.g. private companies) over which 
they hold influence from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights in oth-
er countries; [emphasis added] 
 
•Take steps through international assistance and cooperation, depending on the 
availability of resources, to facilitate fulfilment of human rights in other coun-
tries, including disaster relief, emergency assistance, and assistance to refugees 
and displaced persons; 
 
•Ensure that human rights are given due attention in international agreements 
and that such agreements do not adversely impact upon human rights.”109 
 
This position of the CESCR endorsed by the HRC is also supported by many scholars in-
sisting that at a minimum, States should refrain from adopting regulations negatively im-
pacting on the enjoyment rights abroad and States should also control the activities of pri-
vate actors, particularly TNCs with their nationality, to ensure that these corporations do 
not violate the protected rights in foreign territory110.   
 
It could be argued that the CESCR is interpreting the ICESCR in a manner amending the 
treaty but it is more appropriate to conclude that the CESCR has clarified vaguely drafted 
provisions in a manner to give a meaning to these provisions111.  From the provision of the 
ICESCR and the interpretation given by the CESCR,  it appears that the protection for ESC 
rights is applicable within a State party’s territory and jurisdiction, the latter not being con-
fined by a State’s territorial boundaries.  The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (hereafter: 
OP-ICESCR) enabling individual complaints on ESC rights entered into force in May 
2013.  Until then the complaints procedure under the ICESCR was inexistent explaining 
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why there is no case law with regards to ICESCR.  The OP-ICESCR might certainly con-
tribute in the future to further clarify the scope of States’ extraterritorial obligations under 
the ICESCR. 
 
2.2.2 UN Charter Principles 
A parallel to the UN Charter’s principles can shed light on the scope of the ICESCR as the 
ICESCR recognizes the UN Charter’s principles in its preamble.  The UN Charter high-
lights the general extraterritorial obligations of States112.  Article 1 paragraph 3 of the UN 
Charter providing for the principle of international protection of human rights underlines 
the need for international cooperation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all”.  Additionally, in accordance with articles 
55 and 56, the UN Charter requires UN Member States to “take joint and separate action” 
to realize the objectives of the Charter which include the universal respect for human rights 
and its fundamental freedoms.  The claim that human rights obligations are merely territo-
rial would overlook these provisions of the UN Charter which invite States to collaborate 
and to act jointly for the respect of human rights113.   
International human rights law should be qualified as “overarching international norms” 
which must be respected by all States by virtue of their membership to the UN114.  These 
norms may give rise to international States’ obligations on the basis of general international 
law or on the basis of being a party to ICESCR or other relevant instruments.  
 
Skogly and Gibney suggest that if human rights protection was something States could 
achieve individually there would be no need for international treaties to ensure their protec-
tion.  The universality of human rights should not be limited by territorial borders115.  Hu-
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man rights are declared to be universal but yet their protection is limited by territorial bor-
ders.  Universality is applied to the enjoyment of rights, but not to the corresponding obli-
gations.  What are rights without obligations?  As argued by Henry Shue “[a] proclamation 
of a right is not the fulfillment of a right, any more than an airplane schedule is a flight”116.  
The sovereignty of states117 is a central element of international law but state’s borders 
should facilitate rather than restrict the protection of human rights.   Henry Shue explained 
that universal rights might not entail universal duties but certainly full coverage, implying 
that all the negative duties fall upon everyone, but the positive duties shall be divided 
among the duty bearers118.  
 
In fact, following general principles of international law (such as the equal sovereignty of 
States and the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter article 2(1) and 
(7)), States necessarily have more human rights obligations towards their nationals.  But the 
universality of human rights agreed upon, in for instance, the UN Charter, the UDHR and 
the ICESCR, must also be recognized and could form a strong basis for the recognition of 
extraterritorial human rights obligations of States.  
 
2.3 UN Guiding Principles (2011) 
Over the last decades, efforts were dedicated to develop principles and frameworks defin-
ing human rights obligations.  None of these principles and frameworks are legally binding 
but as they codify existing international law, they may become indirectly binding and do 
reflect the current status of thinking on these issues119.  In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted the UN Norms but they were 
rejected in 2004 due to an overwhelming negative reception by the business community.  
The UN Norms focus primarily on the responsibilities of corporations but do underline that 
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States have the main responsibility for the realization of human rights120.  In the aftermath 
of the failure to adopt the UN Norms and concerned by the importance of understanding 
the complex interrelationship between business and human rights, Ruggie was appointed to 
the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.  The UN Guiding Principles, developed by Ruggie, were en-
dorsed by the HRC in 2011.  By endorsing the UN Guiding Principles, the UN Member 
States adopted for the first time a common position on the standards of the business and 
human rights interrelationship.  The Principles are the result of a broad consensus and were 
welcomed with a “widespread positive reception”121 by business actors, human advocacy 
groups and governments.  For the purpose of this paper, we will look at the guidance the 
UN Guiding Principles can provide on the extraterritorial obligation of States to protect 
against corporate abuses.  In fact, the Principles do not provide a solution for all the busi-
ness and human rights challenges but mark “the end of the beginning” by providing a 
“common global platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-
step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments”122.   
 
The UN Guiding Principles, a set of 31 recommendations including foundational and oper-
ational principles, stem from the three pillars of the PRR Framework123.  It results from 
these three pillars that the primary human rights responsibility is borne by the State.  States 
shall protect individuals from corporate abuses, obligation imposed by human rights law124.  
Ruggie underlined the challenge of governmental incoherence where governments make 
human rights commitments without ensuring implementation (vertical incoherence) and 
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where some departments’ (trade, investment, development) actions produce adverse effects 
on Governments’ human rights obligations125.  In its Report on human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises (2008), Ruggie highlighted the imbalance 
between the power of host States and TNCs where important protection is given to inves-
tors and their TNCs leaving host States in difficult position when faced with the need to 
strengthen social and environmental standards.  Some agreements include a clause mandat-
ing the host State to freeze the existing regulations for the duration of the project126.  On 
this matter, M. Sornarajah argues that home States should control the conduct of their 
TNCs.  Such an obligation would be the logical counterpart of the wide protection con-
ferred to investors127.  But Ruggie did not acknowledge that the State obligation to protect 
extends extraterritorially.  In accordance with the UN Guiding Principles, home States are 
therefore left with a discretionary rather than an imperative duty to regulate their TNCs. 
 
The foundational principles differentiate the obligations between host States and home 
States following the principle of “differentiated but complementary responsibilities”128.  
According to Principle 1, the host State has the obligation “to respect, protect and fulfill the 
human rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction”129 including a duty to 
protect from abuses committed by third parties, such as TNCs.  The primary responsibility 
for human rights protection lies on the host State.  This duty to protect is considered a 
standard of conduct implying that States are not in such responsible for human rights abus-
es committed by private entities.  But States can be held accountable if the abuse commit-
ted can be attributed to them or if they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent and redress 
corporate human rights abuses130.   
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On the other hand, Principle 2 stipulates a much weaker obligation towards the home 
State131.  Home States “should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their opera-
tions”.    Ruggie maintained that home States are “not generally required” nor are they 
“generally prohibited” to regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporate entities domi-
ciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction132.  In the PRR Framework,  Ruggie explained 
that home States of TNCs “may be reluctant to regulate against overseas harm” committed 
by these TNCs either because “the permissible scope of national regulation with extraterri-
torial effect remains poorly understood”, or “out of concern that those firms might lose 
investment opportunities or relocate their headquarters”133.  The UN Guiding principles do 
not expand on the recognized jurisdiction basis.  Consequently, Ruggie affirmed that States 
are free to but are not required to adopt domestic measures with extraterritorial repercus-
sions (ex.: requiring corporations to report on their global operations) or direct extraterrito-
rial legislation and enforcement (ex.: allowing for prosecutions on the basis of the national-
ity of the perpetrator with no regard where the offence occurred)134.  Partnerships between 
home States and host States are nevertheless encouraged in order to regulate companies and 
ensure protection of human rights135.   
 
Operational principle 3 states that the general State duty to protect, applicable to host and 
home States, implies: the enforcement of laws requiring and enabling business enterprises 
to respect human rights; guidance on how corporations can respect human rights through-
out their operations; and support business enterprises to share their methods on how they 
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address human rights impacts.  Ruggie underlined the importance of effectively enforcing 
existing law regulating business for human rights and of clarifying laws in this regard136. 
 
Additional measures are required if the corporations is owned or controlled by the State 
(for instance, Statoil where the Norwegian State is the largest shareholder) or received sup-
port or services by the State which include requiring human rights due diligence137.  Human 
rights abuses committed by a State owned or controlled corporation may result in the viola-
tion of that particular State’s international law obligations138.  The closer a business is tied 
to the State, the stronger is the rationale for ensuring that the business entity respect human 
rights139.  This tie between a corporation and the State will place higher expectations on 
that entity to adhere to international human rights standards.  Ruggie suggests that States 
should encourage and if appropriate obligate the concerned private actors to exercise hu-
man rights due diligence140.  Furthermore, if contracting a corporation for the provision of 
services (e.g. water supply or waste management), States should apply adequate oversight 
on the activities of that corporation to ensure that its human rights obligations are met and 
if conducting commercial transactions with a corporation, States should promote respect of 
human rights by those corporations141.   
 
According to Principle 7, States are also required to offer support to business enterprises in 
conflict zones to ensure that they are not involved in human rights abuses142 (for example, 
Chinese mining companies operating in parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo or the 
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foreign oil companies operating in Sudan143).  In such conflict situations, home States 
should also offer support to host States which may be unable to protect human rights 
properly.  Ruggie emphasized that the “neighboring States” can provide further assistance 
to the host State144.  This is the only Principle giving a role to the home State.  Finally, 
principles 8-10 emphasize the need for policy coherence within the State.  More particular-
ly, according to principle 10, States, as members of multilateral institutions, “should” (soft 
obligation) “seek to ensure that those institutions neither restrain the ability of their mem-
ber States to meet their duty to protect nor hinder business enterprises from respecting hu-
man rights” and “encourage those institutions […] to promote business respect for human 
rights and to […] help States meet their duty to protect against human rights abuse by busi-
ness enterprises”. 
 
Ruggie views the human rights treaty monitoring bodies as requiring State to take steps to 
prevent human rights violations but he claims that it is not clear what are the steps to be 
taken145.  He underlines that experts disagree on “whether international law requires home 
States to help prevent human rights abuses abroad by corporations based within their terri-
tory”146 and concluded that there is simply no prohibition for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction if in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable interna-
tional law147.  Ruggie drew its conclusions taking into consideration the ambiguity on the 
status of extraterritorial human rights obligations.   
 
In conclusion, according to the UN Guiding Principles, home States are not required to 
help in preventing human rights violations by corporations based on their territory but are 
not denied the right to do so in the two following situations: a basis for jurisdiction is rec-
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ognized or the reasonableness test requirements are met (such as the respect of the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State)148.  In the case of abuses in conflict 
affected areas, home States “have a role to play” by assisting host States in ensuring that 
corporations are not involved in human rights abuses.   
 
Vandenhole argued that the UN Guiding Principles offer a “narrow and retrogressive ap-
proach to the human rights obligations of home States” as they adopt soft and non-legal 
terms to address them149.  Others qualify the PRR Framework and its principles as “diplo-
matic” implying that the diplomatic language used to connect business and human rights 
lacks the strength for more radical changes where human rights are actually applied to 
business, underestimating the role of States and of corporations150.  Jägers also argued that 
while the UN Guiding Principles emphasize the duties of States to protect, a stronger word-
ing would have been necessary to ensure that States and corporations respect their human 
rights obligations.  She even considered that the State’s duty to protect as formulated in the 
UN Guiding Principles “weakens existing human rights obligations”151 referring to the 
statement of professor Ruggie asserting that “at present States are not generally required 
under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses 
domiciles in their territory and/or jurisdiction”152.   
 
Ruggie is entitled to disagree with the view of the CESCR, stating in various General 
Comments that States do have extraterritorial obligations153.  The CESCR’s comments are 
not legally binding and there is still no general consensus among the international commu-
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nity on the issue of extraterritorial obligations of States.  But, as stressed by Knox, Inde-
pendent Expert on human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment, it would have been more accurate to characterise the 
interpretations of the CESCR as being unsettled rather than stating that the ICESCR does 
not include binding extraterritorial obligations to protect on States Parties154.  Ruggie could 
have acknowledged the current trend towards a greater recognition of such obligations155. 
 
Following the UN Guiding Principles, the question of whether States have an obligation to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of their corporations remains unresolved.  The pur-
pose of this paper is certainly not to criticize the outcome of Ruggie’s mandate but rather to 
analyze whether any clarification was given with regard to extraterritorial States’ obligation 
to protect.  The UN Guiding Principles were successful in providing the “authoritative fo-
cal point [for business and human rights] that had been missing”156 but very weak extrater-
ritorial obligations were formulated for home States.   Ruggie did not have the mandate to 
solve all the challenges of applying human rights standards to corporations but rather to 
clarify the standards of responsibility and accountability for TNCs and States which he 
accomplished. 
 
Finally, Ruggie underscored that “there are strong policy reasons for home States to set out 
clearly the expectations that business respect human rights abroad, especially where the 
State itself is involved in or supports those businesses”157 but he did not go further in speci-
fying any obligations.  In 2011 in his proposal for the Human Rights Council to follow-up, 
Ruggie underlined that certain international legal standards, such as the extension of juris-
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diction abroad and the bases for the exercise of such a jurisdiction require clarification158.  
Ruggie has also highlighted the urge to address the different extraterritorial obligations 
arising in the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  When clearly defined, not all catego-
ries of extraterritorial obligations might trigger objections159.   
 
 
2.4 Maastricht Principles (2011) 
Building on the Limburg Principles (1986) and the Maastricht Guidelines (1997)160, the 
Maastricht Principles were adopted in 2011 by leading experts in international law and hu-
man rights law.  Signatories include current and former UN Special Rapporteurs of the UN 
Human Rights Council, current and former members of UN human rights treaty bodies, as 
well as, scholars and legal advisers from prominent non-governmental organizations, re-
search centres and institutions such as FIAN International, Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights and Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.  The 
Maastricht Principles consolidate the jurisprudence and disentangle legal parameters on the 
extraterritorial obligations of States in the area of ESC rights aiming at clarifying the nor-
mative framework and filling the accountability gaps161.  Particular focus is given to ESC 
rights as it has been more extensively developed on the basis of international cooperation 
but shall not be interpreted that the Maastricht Principles are not relevant to CP rights162. 
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2.4.1 Jurisdiction 
The Maastricht Principles focus on the question of jurisdiction as it is a key concept in de-
fining extraterritorial State obligations.  Following the Maastricht Principles, jurisdiction is 
defined as “an application of state power or authority to act pursuant to or as an expression 
of sovereignty”163.  Jurisdiction has served as a bar and as a basis for the recognition of 
extraterritorial human rights obligations164.  With regards to CP rights, the debate on extra-
territorial obligations has mainly been reduced to questions of jurisdiction where extraterri-
torial jurisdiction was recognized solely in cases of effective control over territory / au-
thority over persons.  On the other hand ESC rights may offer more space for the recogni-
tion of extraterritorial obligations in other circumstances. Maastricht Principle 9 provides 
thus for a broader scope of the concept of jurisdiction and stipulates other situations when 
human rights obligations of States may extend extraterritorially165. 
 
1) According to Maastricht Principle 9, extraterritorial jurisdiction is applicable, firstly, in 
“situations over which [the State] exercises authority or effective control, whether or not 
such control is exercised in accordance with international law”.   
The effective control doctrine was mainly developed though CP rights jurisprudence166 but 
following the interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of CP and ESC rights, the 
notion of effective control can also be applied to ESC rights.  For instance, with regards to 
effective control, in a situation of occupation, the occupying power shall be obligated to 
respect, protect and fulfill human rights in the occupied territory167.  This is in accordance 
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with the view of the UN Human Rights Treaties bodies168 which was endorsed by the In-
ternational Court of Justice169.  The HRC has clearly stated that: “it would be unconsciona-
ble to so interpret the responsibility under the article 2 of the Covenant [ICCPR] as to per-
mit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, 
which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory”170.   
 
This concept of authority or effective control with respect to extraterritorial States obliga-
tions has also been extensively considered by the ECtHR with regards to CP rights en-
shrined in the ECHR171.  The ECtHR has taken divergent approach with regards to the ex-
traterritorial States obligations.  Some argue that the Court’s reluctance to affirm that hu-
man rights standards cover all international activities could rest in the understanding that 
States might find themselves ill-equipped to secure each human right in their activities 
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abroad172.  This criterion has also been discussed and applied by the Inter-American sys-
tem173. 
 
As previously mentioned, ICESCR does not contain a provision limiting the scope of 
States’ parties obligations which could imply that the obligations apply regardless of the 
location of the alleged violation174.  The mention of jurisdiction in the OP-ICESCR175 re-
fers to the admissibility conditions and does not limit the scope of ICESCR.  Furthermore, 
ICESCR does not specify the rights holders of the obligations stipulated in the Covenant.  
Consequently, it could be presumed that the obligations stipulated are at least owned to the 
persons whose human rights enjoyment and protection are within a state’ control, power or 
authority176.  With respect to TNCs, States could be in situations where they exercise con-
trol over corporations, notably in oil companies part of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC)177.  In a States’ owned corporation (e.g. Sinopec or Gazprom) 
the State might also be considered as exercising effective control on the activities of the 
corporation178.  But TNCs might also be mainly controlled by private investors179 which 
might not trigger extraterritorial States’ obligations following the authority / effective con-
trol criterion.   
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2) Secondly, extraterritorial jurisdiction is applicable in “situations over which State acts or 
omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights, whether within or outside its territory”.  In other words, States’ obligations may be 
triggered in situations where the State knew or should have known (foreseeability) that its 
conduct would impact on the enjoyment of human rights in another State180.  This standard 
refers to the requirement to exercise due diligence181.  Also referring to foreseeability, 
Maastricht Principle 13 stipulates on the obligation to avoid causing harm extraterritorial-
ly182.  Following this Principle, states’ conduct should be based on the precautionary prin-
ciple. 
 
European and American agricultural subsidies undermining farmers’ abilities to earn a 
basic living in other countries (mostly developing countries) is an example of the impact 
States can have on other States183.   Human Rights impact assessments become of primary 
importance in such situations.  According to Maastricht Principle 14, States must assess the 
impacts of their laws, policies and practices on the realization of ESC rights outside their 
national territories.   
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The place of incorporation of a TNC might trigger obligations for the home State of that 
TNC.  The Home State could have impact on the territorial and extraterritorial activities of 
a TNC domestically registered which may affect the ESC rights of individuals living in the 
TNC`s host State.  Regulation of corporations is an integral part of the obligation to protect 
(which will be further detailed below).  In order to prevent foreseeable violations of human 
rights, States might be required to regulate TNC’s activities though domestic legislation 
with an extraterritorial reach184 . 
 
3) Finally, the obligations of States will be triggered in “situations in which the State, act-
ing separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is 
in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social 
and cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with international law”185.   
 
The component referring to the position of a State to take measures to realize ESC rights 
relates more specifically to the concept of international assistance and cooperation186.  
Concerning the capacity to exercise decisive influence, TNCs might be controlled by pri-
vate investors.  These private actors might be dependent on States with regards to bilateral 
investment treaties and trade agreements.  The support of the home State might therefore be 
essential for the TNC which would give rise to this decisive influence standard187.  When a 
State becomes a market participant, by providing investment insurance or export credits or 
by financially investing in corporations, it is connected with other market participants, such 
as TNCs, and it accordingly has the capacity to influence, by legal or political means, these 
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participants impacting on human rights188.  Consequently, when a State can exercise deci-
sive influence on a TNC, that particular State has an obligation to protect the human rights 
of the individuals in the TNC’s host State from abuses of that TNC. 
 
The International Court of Justice (hereafter: ICJ) has elaborated criteria to determine the 
capacity to influence of a State in the context of preventing genocide abroad.  These criteria 
could also be referred to in respect of preventing ESC rights violations abroad189: geo-
graphical distance of the State concerned from the alleged events; strength of the political 
links or other links between the authorities of that State and the main actor of the events; 
and the legal position of that State with regards to the situations and the individuals the 
danger or the ESC rights violations190.  If the process of extraterritorial ESC rights viola-
tions originates from the TNC’s home State, the victims of that violation may fall under the 
jurisdiction of that home State191.  In this case, the violation would have a territorial con-
nection with the home State but would remain indirectly extraterritorial.  As human rights 
are universally recognized, their enforcement by a TNC’s home state should not be consid-
ered to amount to the violation of the TNC’s host State’s sovereignty192.  It is argued that 
“the link with international human-rights law weakens concerns over jurisdictional over-
reach in view of the universal acceptance of human rights”193.  De Schutter maintains that 
extraterritorial home state regulation can contribute to facilitate Host State territorial human 
rights obligations194.  In this context, “[h]ome-State regulation then becomes cooperative 
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rather than antagonistic”195 as the home State does not seek to protect its own interests but 
rather the interest of the international community by protecting human rights.    
 
Following the possible situations of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Maastricht Principles 
also underline the limits imposed on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Maastricht 
Principle 10 emphasized that the obligations of a State to respect, protect and fulfill human 
rights cannot be invoked as a justification to violate the UN Charter or general international 
law.  The sovereignty of the host State, the principle of non-intervention and the principle 
of the equality of all States could impose limits on the obligation of the home State to en-
sure the full realization of human rights196.  Consequently, Canada, for instance, will be 
obligated to protect the rights of individuals failing under its jurisdiction even if these indi-
viduals are located in Guatemala.  If these individuals do not fall under the jurisdiction of 
Canada, Canada might still be entitled to secure human rights protection to the individuals 
in Guatemala.  But if there are weak connections between Canada and the individuals from 
Guatemala and if Guatemala strongly objects the extraterritorial regulation of Canada, 
Canada may exceed its obligation to protect and violate the principle of non-interference. 
 
2.4.2 Obligation to Protect 
International human rights law, the ICJ and human rights bodies have recognized that hu-
man rights obligations can extend extraterritorially197.  Based on this recognition, Maas-
                                                 
 
195
 Wouters and Ryngaert (2009), p.956; Rome Statute art. 17 (1)( a) 
196
 Maastricht Principle 10, commentary  p.1109 
197
 Maastricht principle 6; The HRC (General comment No.31 on  ICCPR) recognized that article 2(1) ICCPR 
obliges States parties to ensure the respect of ICCPR rights for “anyone within their power or effective con-
trol, even if not situated within the territory of the state party, not limiting this requirement to citizens and 
including situations outside a State’ territory and situations of armed conflict” (CCPR/C/21 /Rev.1/Add.13, 
para 10-11).  But there is no case law specifically on ESC rights as until recently no complaints mechanism 
was in force. Also refer to: DRC v Uganda, ICJ, (2005); Advisory Opinion on the Wall, ICJ, (2004); Adviso-
 44
tricht Principle 3 and 4 specify that States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfill 
human rights within their territory and extraterritorially.  This does not imply that each 
State is responsible for the realization of the human rights of every individual in the world 
but it does imply that States do have extraterritorial obligations (complementary obliga-
tions) in certain circumstances identified in the principles198.  The Maastricht Principles 
also highlight the obligations of States as members of international organizations and the 
need for policy coherence199.  In accordance with the CESCR, the Maastricht Principles 
refer to the duty to cooperate internationally200 as the overarching notion supporting the 
extraterritorial obligation of States with regards to ESC rights. The Maastricht Principles 
suggest a broad understanding of international cooperation which includes assistance as 
well as the development of international rules creating an enabling environment for the 
realization of human rights and an obligation to refrain from undermining human rights in 
other countries and to ensure that non-state actors are also prohibited from impairing the 
enjoyment of human rights201.  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a soft-law 
instrument agreed upon the UN Member States, also support the view that partnerships and 
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cooperation are necessary components for the realizations of human rights and the 
MDGs202.   
 
As the main focus of this paper is on the scope of the extraterritorial obligation of States to 
protect, we will therefore limit our analysis to that particular obligation.   The Maastricht 
Principles divide the State duty to protect as being an obligation to regulate, influence and 
cooperate.  The obligation to protect is considered an obligation to exercise due dili-
gence203.  The obligation to regulate implies that States “must” take the necessary measures 
to adopt regulations ensuring that third actors (such as TNCs, private individuals and or-
ganizations) will not impair ESC rights in some specific circumstances as stipulated in 
Maastricht Principle 25 detailed below.  This is the strong legal obligation (“must”).  This 
obligation to regulate to protect human rights is well-established in international human 
rights law204.  If a State fails to adopt regulations or to implement them effectively and if 
this omission results in a human rights violation, the responsibility of that State will be 
triggered205.  
 
The duty to protect and regulate also implies that a State should not allow its national terri-
tory to be used to cause damage to another State which is a recognized principle of interna-
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tional law206.  States have a duty to control the activities of private actors on their territory 
to ensure that not harm is caused within or outside their territory.  This was also expressly 
recognized by the CESCR207.   
 
Referring to the traditional bases of jurisdiction in international law, Maastricht Principle 
25208 stipulates the jurisdictional bases given rise to an extraterritorial protect-obligation to 
regulate.  Firstly, the State’s duty to regulate will be triggered on a territorial or national 
basis (active personality principle), allowing States to regulate the conduct of their nation-
als abroad.  A basis for protection is given when the harm or threat of harm originates or 
occurs on a State’s territory or if the TNC has the nationality of the State concerned.  It is 
now well-established that the nationality concept used for individuals can be used for estab-
lishing the nationality of corporations209.  Corporations’ nationality can therefore be de-
rived from the place of incorporation (creation of a legal person), from the links to a partic-
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ular State (center of administration/siège social) or from the nationality of the natural or 
legal persons owning or controlling the corporation210.   
 
Based on the active personality principle, a basis for protection is given “where the corpo-
ration, or its parent or controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domi-
ciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business activities, in the State con-
cerned”.  In the case that directives are given or measures are taken in the State headquar-
tering a TNC, that particular State should exercise due diligence to prevent measures negat-
ing human rights to be taken by TNCs211.   
 
When abuses take place, the parent company has certainly a role to play and should be held 
accountable for its actions or omissions.  This is referred to as the “parent-based extraterri-
torial regulation”.  In practice, the reality is that corporations often operate in different 
states and are organized in different legal entities.  An example would be the Netherlands 
imposing the Royal Dutch Shell (a company incorporated in the United Kingdom) to con-
trol the activities of Shell Nigeria (subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell located in Nigeria)212.  
                                                 
 
210
 Maastricht Principle 25, Commentary, p.1140-1141; Belgium v Spain (1970) para 70; In Guinea v Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (2007) the International Court of Justice confirmed that the nationality of a 
corporation is normally decided upon its place of incorporation; De Schutter, Extraterritorial jurisdiction as a 
tool for improving the human rights accountability of transnational corporations. (2006) p.29-45 
211
 Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2012) p. 229 
212
 Friday Alfred Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell (2013); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co. (2013): Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a foreign victim of human rights violations committed by a corporations 
sufficiently linked to the United States could seek damages before a Court of the United States.  In the Kiobel 
case, the Dutch parent company Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary (Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, SPDC) were both accused of complicity in crimes against humanity, acts of torture and arbitrary 
execution committed by the Nigerian army against Ogoni people pursuant to the ATCA. The Court found that 
the ATCA does not apply to the conduct of this case which took place outside of the United States.  This 
decision restricts considerably the scope of ATCA.  The Court relied on the presumption against extraterrito-
 48
The Netherlands can be entitled to regulate a corporation incorporated in the United King-
dom with activities in Nigeria controlled by a parent company headquartered in the Nether-
lands.   Already in its Barcelona Traction judgement, the ICJ acknowledged that the veil of 
a company may be lifted to prevent violations of law213.  The separation of legal personali-
ties should not be used by the parent company or its subsidiaries to limit the scope of their 
legal liability. 
 
An additional ground to enact regulation for protection is the existence of a “reasonable 
link between the State concerned and the conduct it seeks to regulate”.  This reasonable 
link will exist, for instance, if the abuse is carried out in that State’s territory.  And finally, 
a basis for protection will be given whenever the abuses constitute a violation of a peremp-
tory norm of international law.  If the violation constitutes a crime under international law 
(war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, enforced disappearances), univer-
sal jurisdiction can be exercised214.  The Maastricht Principles define the circumstances 
where the exercise of the extraterritorial obligation to protect does not interfere with other 
States’ rights.   
 
The Maastricht Principles also highlight that extraterritorial obligations of States are no 
basis for violating other obligations under international law (i.e. principle of non-
intervention or principle of sovereignty and equality of States) but it is also important to 
recognize that international human rights law impose limit on state sovereignty215.  The 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction can facilitate the coexistence and cooperation be-
tween States in areas of common concern.  The Commentary to the Maastricht principles 
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emphasized the erga omnes character of human rights as reflected in internationally agreed 
documents such as the MDGs.  This erga omnes character of human rights could justify the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in other circumstances than the above mentioned if 
such exercise seeks to protect such rights.  The promotion of erga omnes rights or MDGs is 
in the interest of the whole international community and is not an attempt to impose values 
on another state216. 
 
With regards to the obligation to influence, the Maastricht Principles stipulate that States in 
a position to influence “should” exert their influence (by reporting, using social labeling or 
indicators to monitor progress, etc.) in accordance with international law in order to protect 
ESC rights217.  And finally, States “must” cooperate to prevent abuses by non-State actors, 
to hold them accountable and to ensure that effective remedies are provided218.  As stipu-
lated in Maastricht Principle 23 on the general obligation to protect, States should take ac-
tion “separately, and jointly through international cooperation” to protect ESC rights.  In 
fact, each obligation of the tripartite typology (to respect, protect and fulfill) requires States 
to act separately and jointly through cooperation.  As argued by Coomans, the Maastricht 
Principles stipulate the implicit legal basis for the extraterritorial obligation to protect as 
there is no explicit legal basis in international human rights law219. 
The Maastricht Principles stem from the principal source of international human rights 
law220 but they remain vague on their own legal status221.  Although they might not be the 
creation of a law-making body, their force and authority should not be underestimated as 
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they have been endorsed by human rights experts222.  Scholars such as De Schutter, Ziegler, 
Skogly, Craven, Coomans and Künneman, have recognized the legal duties of States within 
their territory and extraterritorially as stipulated in the Maastricht Principles.  The Maas-
tricht Principles go beyond the UN Guiding Principles with regards to the obligations to 
protect of the home States and detail more broadly on the leads for jurisdiction of the home 
States.  As pointed out by Vandenhole, the division of responsibilities between the host and 
the home State is regrettably still not clearly defined by the Maastricht Principles223.  TNCs 
use different legal systems as it fits their purposes.  Following the Maastricht Principles, 
States shall also begin to cooperate at the same level to regulate TNCs.  Furthermore, build-
ing on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), the Vienna+20 CSO Dec-
laration (2013) stressed the importance of extraterritorial obligations of States to address 
the challenges of globalization as without the acceptance and implementation of extraterri-
torial obligations, human rights cannot be universally realized.  The Declaration of 2013 
also urges States to apply the Maastricht Principles and the law and principles on which 
they are based224.  More and more recognition is given to the extraterritorial obligations of 
States, especially for ESC rights. 
 
2.5 Mubende Case 
Fons Coomans and Rolf Künnemann presented a collection of cases involving the extrater-
ritorial conduct of States to raise awareness and promote the application of extraterritorial 
States’ obligations225.  The Mubende case is of particular interest for the purpose of this 
paper. 
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In 2001, the Government of Uganda deployed its army to displace 392 families at gunpoint 
from their homes and lands in the Mubende District of Uganda to make place for a coffee 
plantation owned by Kaweri Coffee Plantation, a subsidiary of the German company Neu-
mann Kaffee Gruppe(NRK) Hamburg.  Neither adequate compensation nor social assis-
tance was offered to the displaced families (violation of the right to an adequate standard of 
living – right to housing, article 11(1) ICESCR).  The school building was used as the 
headquarters for the company leaving the children of the community without a school for 
about a year226.  Furthermore in 2002, the African Development Bank (hereafter: AfDB) 
approved a loan of 2,5 million USD to finance the new coffee plantation project.  Kaweri 
plantation is the first large scale coffee plantation in Uganda. Until then, coffee was only 
produced by small coffee farms.  Coffee is one the major source of income for the country 
accounting for 70% of Uganda’s export earnings. 
 
In 2002, the victims sought redress of their grievances by suing the government and Kaw-
eri.  The case has been delayed over many years.  Finally, in 2013, the High Court in Kam-
pala, Uganda ordered compensation (approximately eleven million Euros) be paid to the 
2041 evictees of land now occupied by the Kaweri Coffee Plantation227.  The judgment 
clearly condemns NKG, but it remains unclear why the Ugandan Government was acquit-
ted of all responsibility.228  Following the outcome of the judgment, Kaweri filed an appeal.   
 
Without minimizing the territorial obligations of Uganda, we will nevertheless focus on the 
extraterritorial obligations of Germany.  Germany is the home State of the parent corpora-
tion NKG and the one of the governing States of the AfDB.  With regards to the ICESCR, 
the right to an adequate standard of living (art.11 (1)) was violated.  Following the Maas-
tricht Principles, the State of Germany, Party to the ICESCR, is obligated to protect nation-
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als of other countries from abuses committed by German -based companies without in-
fringing on the sovereignty of Uganda (Maastricht Principle 3 and 4 ).  In this case, Ger-
many did not comply with its extraterritorial obligation to protect.  Germany is required to 
monitor the activities of German TNCs and could reasonably be expected to have foreseen 
the violations denounced in this case (Maastricht Principle 23, 24).  The failure of Germany 
to observe its obligation to protect may have facilitated the actions of Kaweri and the 
forced evictions committed by the Ugandan Government229.  By providing a loan for the 
investment, AfDB (of which Germany is a governing State) was complicit in the human 
rights violations.  The extraterritorial protect-obligations of the governing States (Germany) 
would have required them to ensure that the actions supported by AfDB are in lines with 
their human rights obligations (Maastricht Principle 15). 
 
In October 2012, in its Concluding Observations on Germany’s sixth periodic review under 
the ICCPR, the HRC expressed concern with respect to Germany’s protection against the 
human rights abuses of German TNCs operating abroad. Recognizing the extraterritorial 
obligations under the ICCPR, the HRC highlighted that: 
 
“The State party is encouraged to set out clearly the expectation that all busi-
ness enterprises domiciled in its territory and/or its jurisdiction respect human 
rights standards in accordance with the Covenant throughout their operations. It 
is also encouraged to take appropriate measures to strengthen the remedies pro-
vided to protect people who have been victims of activities of such business en-
terprises operating abroad 230”. 
 
It follows from the case studies presented by Coomans and Künnemann that building on 
the extraterritorial obligations of States for ESC rights can close the gap between accounta-
bility and economic globalization.  As a result of economic globalization, a mismatch be-
tween the influence of States and the scope of their duties was created, the Maastricht Prin-
ciples aim at better aligning human rights with the challenges of an interdependent world 
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by suggesting to view human rights as “global public goods” and propose a guidance for 
the reshaping of the international legal order231.  
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 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has considered the specific nature of human rights, more particularly ESC 
rights, in order to clarify the existence, content and scope of States’ extraterritorial 
obligations to protect against corporate abuses of ESC rights.  The impact TNCs can have 
on the realization of human rights is undeniable.  The challenge has been in determining 
legal standards for such situations.  
 
As an intrinsic part of international law, international human rights law is traditionally 
State-centered but bears specific characteristics as it is governing State-Individuals rela-
tions.  Human rights are universal, interdependent, indivisible and interrelated implying 
that all human rights, ESC and CP rights, are to be considered on an equal footing and rec-
ognizing that ICESCR, as ICCPR, gives rise to formal obligations to States parties.  Conse-
quently, with regards to corporate accountability, States shall continue to be obligated to 
ensure that corporations acting within their jurisdiction act in accordance with international 
human rights standards.   
 
In the last decades, much attention was given to the definition of the extraterritorial human 
rights obligations of States.  There might still not be a clear legal recognition of the extra-
territorial obligation to protect with regards to ICESCR but there is a growing acceptance 
that the interdependency of States might impose an obligation on all States to act jointly 
when facing collective problems232.  These joint actions may result in an enhanced human 
rights protection rather than a violation of the equal sovereignty of States.  The CESCR has 
endorsed home States’ extraterritorial obligation to protect.  The UN Guiding Principles 
propose a very soft human rights obligation to protect for home States.  The Maastricht 
Principles go beyond the UN Guiding Principles in relation to the extraterritorial obligation 
to protect.  The Maastricht Principles expend the notion of jurisdiction and clearly explain 
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how the tripartite typology of obligations can be applied in an extraterritorial context.  The 
Maastricht Principles significantly clarify the scope of extraterritorial obligations of States 
but the division of obligations between the host and the home State remained ambiguous.  
Furthermore, following the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (2011) (hereafter: OECD Guidelines) were revised to align 
with the UN Guiding Principles.  The OECD Guidelines, a corporate code of conduct, fo-
cus mostly on TNCs’ duty to respect human rights but in their newly incorporated part on 
human rights it is also stipulated that “States have a duty to protect human rights”.  Adher-
ence to the OECD Guidelines could indicate a recognition by the OECD home States of 
their obligation to protect against human rights abuses by TNCs incorporated in their coun-
tries233.  The legal framework concerned with the extraterritorial obligations of home States 
is still in development.  It is nevertheless possible to conclude that at the present moment 
there is a strong argument supporting States’ extraterritorial obligation to protect ESC 
rights against corporate abuses.  At a very minimum home States “have the right” to enact 
regulations requiring companies incorporated in their territory to respect human rights in 
their conduct abroad234. 
 
The reconnaissance and acceptance of extraterritorial human rights obligations of States, 
for instance by endorsing the Maastricht Principles, will contribute to the respect and pro-
tection of ESC rights especially when host States lack the ability to regulate TNCs and en-
sure their compliance with human rights standards.  In an area of globalization, extraterrito-
rial obligations of States need to be clearly defined and recognized in order to ensure global 
justice.  
 
To further clarify the scope of States’ extraterritorial obligations, the adoption of a new 
international instrument establishing a clear division of responsibilities between the home 
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State and the host State in regards to the regulation of TNCs was suggested235. This instru-
ment would reaffirm the primary responsibility of the host State in which the TNC con-
ducts its activities and would give a clear subsidiary responsibility to the home State to 
exercise control on the TNCs over which it has jurisdiction.  It is argued that such an in-
strument would ensure that TNCs are not left scot-free, the victims not left without reme-
dies, the business community a certain degree of certainty and public international lawyers 
the progression towards international cooperation236. 
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Annex 
 
CESCR, General Comments  
-Emphasis on States’ Extraterritorial Obligations- 
 
No Subject Year Emphasis on States’ Extraterritorial Obligations 
21 Right of Everyone to 
Take Part in Cultural Life 
2009 International Obligations  
 
56. In its general comment No. 3 (1990), the Committee draws at-
tention to the obligation of States parties to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
through economic and technical cooperation, with a view to achiev-
ing the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. In 
the spirit of Article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, as well 
as specific provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 1, and arts. 15 and 23), 
States parties should recognize and promote the essential role of 
international cooperation in the achievement of the rights recog-
nized in the Covenant, including the right of everyone to take part in 
cultural life, and should fulfil their commitment to take joint and 
separate action to that effect.  
 
57. States parties should, through international agreements where 
appropriate, ensure that the realization of the right of everyone to 
take part in cultural life receives due attention.53 
 
58. The Committee recalls that international cooperation for devel-
opment and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to take part in cultural life, is an obliga-
tion of States parties, especially of those States that are in a position 
to provide assistance. This obligation is in accordance with Articles 
55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as articles 2, 
paragraph 1, and articles 15 and 23 of the Covenant.54 
 
59. In negotiations with international financial institutions and in 
concluding bilateral agreements, States parties should ensure that 
the enjoyment of the right enshrined in article 15, paragraph 1 (a), 
of the Covenant is not impaired. For example, the strategies, pro-
grammes and policies adopted by States parties under structural 
adjustment programmes should not interfere with their core obliga-
tions in relation to the right of everyone, especially the most disad-
vantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, to take part in 
cultural life.55 
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53 See general comment No. 18 (2005), para. 29 
54 General comment No. 3 (1990), para. 14. See also general comment No. 18 
(2005), para. 37.  
55 See general comment No. 18 (2005), para. 30. 
 
20 Non-Discrimination in 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (art. 2, 
para. 2) 
2009 Scope of State Obligations 
14. Under international law, a failure to act in good faith to comply 
with the obligation in article 2, paragraph 2, to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the Covenant will be exercised without discrim-
ination amounts to a violation. Covenant rights can be violated 
through the direct action or omission by States parties, including 
through their institutions or agencies at the national and local levels. 
States parties should also ensure that they refrain from discriminato-
ry practices in international cooperation and assistance and take 
steps to ensure that all actors under their jurisdiction do likewise. 
 
19 The right to Social Secu-
rity 
2007 4. International Obligations 
 
52. Article 2, paragraph 1, and articles 11, paragraph 1, and 23 of 
the Covenant require that States parties recognize the essential role 
of international cooperation and assistance and take joint and sepa-
rate action to achieve the full realization of the rights inscribed in 
the Covenant, including the right to social security.  
 
53. To comply with their international obligations in relation to the 
right to social security, States parties have to respect the enjoyment 
of the right by refraining from actions that interfere, directly or indi-
rectly, with the enjoyment of the right to social security in other 
countries.  
 
54. States parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social 
security by preventing their own citizens and national entities from 
violating this right in other countries. Where States parties can take 
steps to influence third parties (non-State actors) within their juris-
diction to respect the right, through legal or political means, such 
steps should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and applicable international law.  
 
55. Depending on the availability of resources, States parties should 
facilitate the realization of the right to social security in other coun-
tries, for example through provision of economic and technical as-
sistance. International assistance should be provided in a manner 
that is consistent with the Covenant and other human rights stand-
ards, and sustainable and culturally appropriate. Economically de-
veloped States parties have a special responsibility for and interest 
in assisting the developing countries in this regard.  
 
56. States parties should ensure that the right to social security is 
given due attention in international agreements and, to that end, 
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should consider the development of further legal instruments. The 
Committee notes the importance of establishing reciprocal bilateral 
and multilateral international agreements or other instruments for 
coordinating or harmonizing contributory social security schemes 
for migrant workers.33Persons temporarily working in another 
country should be covered by the social security scheme of their 
home country.  
 
57. With regard to the conclusion and implementation of interna-
tional and regional agreements, States parties should take steps to 
ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right 
to social security. Agreements concerning trade liberalization 
should not restrict the capacity of a State Party to ensure the full 
realization of the right to social security.  
 
58. States parties should ensure that their actions as members of 
international organizations take due account of the right to social 
security. Accordingly, States parties that are members of interna-
tional financial institutions, notably the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks, should 
take steps to ensure that the right to social security is taken into 
account in their lending policies, credit agreements and other inter-
national measures. States parties should ensure that the policies and 
practices of international and regional financial institutions, in par-
ticular those concerning their role in structural adjustment and in the 
design and implementation of social security systems, promote and 
do not interfere with the right to social security. 
 
33 See International Convention on the Protection of the Rightsof All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, article 27.  
 
18 The Right to Work (art. 
6) - Final edited version 
2005 International Obligations  
 
29. In its general comment No. 3 (1990) the Committee draws atten-
tion to the obligation of all States parties to take steps individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, towards the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. In the spirit of Article 56 of the Charter 
of the United Nations and specific provisions of the Covenant (arts. 
2.1, 6, 22 and 23), States parties should recognize the essential role 
of international cooperation and comply with their commitment to 
take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the 
right to work. States parties should, through international agree-
ments where appropriate, ensure that the right to work as set forth in 
articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Covenant is given due attention.  
 
30. To comply with their international obligations in relation to 
article 6, States parties should endeavour to promote the right to 
work in other countries as well as in bilateral and multilateral nego-
tiations. In negotiations with international financial institutions, 
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States parties should ensure protection of the right to work of their 
population. States parties that are members of international financial 
institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and regional development banks, should pay greater 
attention to the protection of the right to work in influencing the 
lending policies, credit agreements, structural adjustment pro-
grammes and international measures of these institutions. The strat-
egies, programmes and policies adopted by States parties under 
structural adjustment programmes should not interfere with their 
core obligations in relation to the right to work and impact negative-
ly on the right to work of women, young persons and the disadvan-
taged and marginalized individuals and groups.  
 
Violations of the Obligation to Protect 
 
35. Violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure of 
States parties to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons 
within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to work by 
third parties. They include omissions such as the failure to regulate 
the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent 
them from violating the right to work of others; or the failure to 
protect workers against unlawful dismissal.  
 
17 The right of everyone to 
benefit from the protec-
tion of the moral and 
material interests result-
ing from any scientific, 
literary or artistic produc-
tion of which he is the 
author (art. 15 (1) (c)) - 
Final edited version 
2005 III. STATES PARTIES’ OBLIGATIONS 
International Obligations  
 
36. In its general comment No. 3 (1990), the Committee drew atten-
tion to the obligation of all States parties to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, towards the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. In the spirit of Article 56 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, as well as the specific provisions of the Cov-
enant (arts. 2, para. 1, 15, para. 44 and 23), States parties should 
recognize the essential role of international cooperation for the 
achievement of the rights recognized in the Covenant, including the 
right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material inter-
ests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions, 
and should comply with their commitment to take joint and separate 
action to that effect. International cultural and scientific cooperation 
should be carried out in the common interest of all peoples.  
 
37. The Committee recalls that, in accordance with Articles 55 and 
56 of the Charter of the United Nations, well-established principles 
of international law, and the provisions of the Covenant itself, inter-
national cooperation for development and thus for the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States 
parties and, in particular, of States which are in a position to as-
sist.31 
 
 80
38. Bearing in mind the different levels of development of States 
parties, it is essential that any system for the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and 
artistic productions facilitates and promotes development coopera-
tion, technology transfer, and scientific and cultural coopera-
tion,32while at the same time taking due account of the need to pre-
serve biological diversity.33 
 
31 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, fifth session, general 
comment No. 3 (1990), at paragraph 14.  
32Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, twenty-seventh session, 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Statement by the Committee on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29 November 2001, E/C.12/2001/15, at paragraph 
15.  
33See article 8 (j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity. See also Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 26th meeting, 
Resolution 2001/21, E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2001/21.  
 
16 The equal right of men 
and women to the enjoy-
ment of all economic, 
social and cultural rights 
(art.3) 
2005 none 
15 The right to water (arts. 
11 and 12) 
2002 International Obligations  
 
30. Article 2, paragraph 1, and articles 11, paragraph 1, and 23 of 
the Covenant require that States parties recognize the essential role 
of international cooperation and assistance and take joint and sepa-
rate action to achieve the full realization of the right to water.  
 
31. To comply with their international obligations in relation to the 
right to  water, States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the 
right in other countries. International cooperation requires States 
parties to refrain from actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, 
with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries. Any 
activities undertaken within the State party’s jurisdiction should not 
deprive another country of the ability to realize the right to water for 
persons in its jurisdiction.25 
 
32. States parties should refrain at all times from imposing embar-
goes or similar measures, that prevent the supply of water, as well 
as goods and services essential for securing the right to water.26 
Water should never be used as an instrument of political and eco-
nomic pressure. In this regard, the Committee recalls its position, 
stated in its General Comment No. 8 (1997), on the relationship 
between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
 
33. Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own 
citizens and companies from violating the right to water of individ-
uals and communities in other countries. Where States parties can 
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take steps to influence other third parties to respect the right, 
through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable 
international law.  
 
34. Depending on the availability of resources, States should facili-
tate realization of the right to water in other countries, for example 
through provision of water resources, financial and technical assis-
tance, and provide the necessary aid when required. In disaster relief 
and emergency assistance, including assistance to refugees and dis-
placed persons, priority should be given to Covenant rights, includ-
ing the provision of adequate water. International assistance should 
be provided in a manner that is consistent with the Covenant and 
other human rights standards, and sustainable and culturally appro-
priate. The economically developed States parties have a special 
responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing States in 
this regard.  
 
35. States parties should ensure that the right to water is given due 
attention in international agreements and, to that end, should con-
sider the development of further legal instruments. With regard to 
the conclusion and implementation of other international and re-
gional agreements, States parties should take steps to ensure that 
these instruments do not adversely impact upon the right to water. 
Agreements concerning trade liberalization should not curtail or 
inhibit a country’s capacity to ensure the full realization of the right 
to water.  
 
36. States parties should ensure that their actions as members of 
international organizations take due account of the right to water. 
Accordingly, States parties that are members of international finan-
cial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and regional development banks, should take steps to ensure 
that the right to water is taken into account in their lending policies, 
credit agreements and other international measures.  
 
25 The Committee notes that the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of Watercourses requires that social and human needs be taken 
into account in determining the equitable utilization of watercourses, that States 
parties take measures to prevent significant harm being caused, and,in the event of 
conflict, special regard must be given to the requirements of vital human needs: see 
arts. 5, 7 and 10 of the Convention.  
26 In General Comment No. 8 (1997), the Committee noted the disruptive effect of 
sanctions upon sanitation supplies and clean drinking water, and that sanctions 
regimes should provide for repairs to infrastructure essential to provide clean water.  
 
14 The right to the highest 
attainable standard of 
health (art. 12) 
2000 International Obligations 
 
38. In its General Comment No. 3, the Committee drew attention to 
the obligation of all States parties to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, especially eco-
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nomic and technical, towards the full realization of the rights recog-
nized in the Covenant, such as the right to health. In the spirit of 
article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, the specific provi-
sions of the Covenant (articles 12, 2.1, 22 and 23) and the 
Alma-Ata Declaration on primary health care, States parties should 
recognize the essential role of international cooperation and comply 
with their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve 
the full realization of the right to health. In this regard, States parties 
are referred to the Alma-Ata Declaration which proclaims that the 
existing gross inequality in the health status of the people, particu-
larly between developed and developing countries, as well as within 
countries, is politically, socially and economically unacceptable and 
is, therefore, of common concern to all countries.26 
 
39. To comply with their international obligations in relation to 
article 12, States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right 
to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violat-
ing the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these 
third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. 
Depending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate 
access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other 
countries, wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when 
required. 27 States parties should ensure that the right to health is 
given due attention in international agreements and, to that end, 
should consider the development of further legal instruments. In 
relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, States 
parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not 
adversely impact upon the right to health. Similarly, States parties 
have an obligation to ensure that their actions as members of inter-
national organizations take due account of the right to health. Ac-
cordingly, States parties which are members of international finan-
cial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and regional development banks, should pay greater attention 
to the protection of the right to health in influencing the lending 
policies, credit agreements and international measures of these insti-
tutions. 
 
40. States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolu-
tions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the World 
Health Assembly, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and hu-
manitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to 
refugees and internally displaced persons. Each State should con-
tribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities. Priority in the 
provision of international medical aid, distribution and management 
of resources, such as safe and potable water, food and medical sup-
plies, and financial aid should be given to the most vulnerable or 
marginalized groups of the population. Moreover, given that some 
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diseases are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, the 
international community has a collective responsibility to address 
this problem. The economically developed States parties have a 
special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing 
States in this regard. 
 
41. States parties should refrain at all times from imposing embar-
goes or similar measures restricting the supply of another State with 
adequate medicines and medical equipment. Restrictions on such 
goods should never be used as an instrument of political and eco-
nomic pressure. In this regard, the Committee recalls its position, 
stated in General Comment No. 8, on the relationship between eco-
nomic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
42. While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimate-
ly accountable for compliance with it, all members of society - indi-
viduals, including health professionals, families, local communities, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil socie-
ty organizations, as well as the private business sector - have re-
sponsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health. State 
parties should therefore provide an environment which facilitates 
the discharge of these responsibilities. 
 
26Article II, Alma-Ata Declaration, Report of the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 6-12 September 1978, in: World Health Organiza-
tion, “Health for All” Series, No. 1, WHO, Geneva, 1978 
27. See para. 45 of this General Comment 
 
13 The right to education 
(art. 13) 
1999 Specific Legal Obligations 
 
52. In relation to article 13 (2) (b)-(d), a State party has an immedi-
ate obligation “to take steps” (art. 2 (1)) towards the realization of 
secondary, higher and fundamental education for all those within its 
jurisdiction. (…) 
 
56. In its General Comment 3, the Committee drew attention to the 
obligation of all States parties to take steps, “individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, especially eco-
nomic and technical”, towards the full realization of the rights rec-
ognized in the Covenant, such as the right to education.28 Articles 2 
(1) and 23 of the Covenant, Article 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, article 10 of the World Declaration on Education for All, 
and Part I, paragraph 34 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action all reinforce the obligation of States parties in relation to 
the provision of international assistance and cooperation for the full 
realization of the right to education. In relation to the negotiation 
and ratification of international agreements, States parties should 
take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact 
upon the right to education. Similarly, States parties have an obliga-
tion to ensure that their actions as members of international organi-
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zations, including international financial institutions, take due ac-
count of the right to education 
 
12 The right to adequate 
food (art. 11) 
1999 Obligations and Violations 
 
19. Violations of the right to food can occur through the direct ac-
tion of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States. 
These include: the formal repeal or suspension of legislation neces-
sary for the continued enjoyment of the right to food; denial of ac-
cess to food to particular individuals or groups, whether the discrim-
ination is based on legislation or is proactive; the prevention of ac-
cess to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergen-
cy situations; adoption of legislation or policies which are manifest-
ly incompatible with pre-existing legal obligations relating to the 
right to food; and failure to regulate activities of individuals or 
groups so as to prevent them from violating the right to food of 
others, or the failure of a State to take into account its international 
legal obligations regarding the right to food when entering into 
agreements with other States or with international organizations. 
 
International Obligations of States Parties’ 
 
36. In the spirit of article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 2.1, and 23 of the 
Covenant and the Rome Declaration of the World Food Summit, 
States parties should recognize the essential role of international 
cooperation and comply with their commitment to take joint and 
separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to adequate 
food. In implementing this commitment, States parties should take 
steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, 
to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the 
necessary aid when required. States parties should, in international 
agreements whenever relevant, ensure that the right to adequate 
food is given due attention and consider the development of further 
international legal instruments to that end. 
 
37. States parties should refrain at all times from food embargoes or 
similar measures which endanger conditions for food production 
and access to food in other countries. Food should never be used as 
an instrument of political and economic pressure. In this regard, the 
Committee recalls its position, stated in its General Comment No. 8, 
on the relationship between economic sanctions and respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
11 Plans of action for prima-
ry education (art. 14) 
1999 9. Obligations. […]Where a State party is clearly lacking in the 
financial resources and/or expertise required to “work out and 
adopt” a detailed plan, the international community has a clear obli-
gation to assist. 
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10 The role of national hu-
man rights institutions in 
the protection of econom-
ic, social and cultural 
rights 
1998 none 
9 The domestic application 
of the Covenant 
1998 none 
8 The relationship between 
economic sanctions and 
respect for economic, 
social and cultural rights 
1997 none 
 
7 The right to adequate 
housing: forced evictions 
(art.11 (1)) 
1997 none 
6 The economic, social and 
cultural rights of older 
persons 
1995 none 
5 Persons with disabilities 1994 none 
4 The right to adequate 
housing 
1991 none 
3 The nature of States par-
ties' obligations (art.2 (1)) 
1990 14. The Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with 
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-
established principles of international law, and with the provisions 
of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development 
and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is 
an obligation of all States. 
2 International technical 
assistance measures (art. 
22) 
1990 none 
1 Reporting by States par-
ties 
1989 3. A second objective is to ensure that the State party monitors the 
actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis 
and is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are 
not, being enjoyed by all individuals within its territory or under its 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
